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This paper derives a  stochastic endogenous growth model that investigates the impact of 
European Union integration on convergence and productivity growth. We deviate from the 
general strand of literature by not only deriving a theoretical model for the effects of 
integration on the rate of economic growth, but also by using more appropriate estimation 
techniques. The outcome of a series of panel and structural break tests examining the 
accession process of five recent members to the Union generally show improved rates of 
productivity growth and convergence to EU standards. We then draw from the experience of 
these recent members to derive implications for the first-round EU candidate countries. 
Subsequent tests on the first-round candidate countries find a high level of heterogeneity in 
growth rates, and a fast-paced convergence to EU standards.  1.  Introduction 
  In an age where many former communist countries strive to become a member of the 
European Union (EU) and policy circles discuss how best to synchronize the policies so that 
the existing members “all” benefit, it is natural to ask whether the EU membership pays off 
and eliminates the divergence of EU’s incumbents over time. To answer this question, we 
formulate and test a stochastic endogenous growth model that investigates the impact of EU 
integration on convergence and productivity growth. We achieve this by combining the ideas 
in Rivera-Batiz & Romer (hereafter, RB-R, 1991) and Lee, Pesaran & Smith (LPS, 1997), 
complemented later on by a battery of structural break and panel data tests. 
This paper contributes to the literature in significant ways. First, we extend the stochastic 
neoclassical growth model of LPS by implementing the ‘integration parameter’ of RB-R to 
analyze the effects of accession into the Union. We assume that integration to a wider body of 
knowledge that comes with (prospective) membership into the EU leads to higher returns to 
scale by enhancing the effectiveness of capital, hence speeding up the convergence process. 
Second, we test the findings of our theoretical model by utilizing the methodology by LPS, 
which provides a sound framework regarding the variables that should be included in the 
estimation
1. The use of this technique especially fits our analysis since it corrects for the false 
inference i n convergence when technological progress or sufficient heterogeneity are not 
adequately accounted for. Third, we complement the LPS tests with a series of structural 
break tests to validate the implications of the theoretical model regarding changes in the 
parameters of the growth process. Finally, we apply our modified theoretical model to the 
case of real convergence of the candidate transition economies to gain insight on the prospects 
of their integration to the EU by drawing from the experience of recent EU members during 
pre- and post-membership periods.  To our best knowledge, our work is the first research that 
                                                
1 Earlier studies use rather ad hoc specifications with many control variables to test for convergence, developing 
models that have very little reliance on growth theory.   brings theory and empirics together to analyze the impact of integration on convergence and 
productivity growth. 
There are some related studies that complement ours. Henrekson, Thorstensson & 
Thorstensson (1997) examine the role of trade  and institutional integration on economic 
growth, using a purely empirical approach on European Community (EC) and European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) countries a long with a sample of OECD countries. Using a cross-
sectional and pooled OLS study, their study finds that joining the EU or EFTA enhances 
growth. Crespo-Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Grünwald, and Silgoner (2002) examine the impact of 
European integration on economic growth of current EU members, using a panel regression. 
They find that the length of EU membership has a significant and positive effect on growth, 
and it is higher for poorer countries, suggesting an asymmetric impact of EU membership. 
These studies solely focus on a regression analysis of the relation between membership and 
growth without providing an underlying theoretical framework or projections for the 
candidate economies.  Martin and Velázquez (2001), Wagner and Hlouskova (2002) and 
Boldrin and Canova (2003) provide a descriptive analysis of how different experiences of 
convergence of the recent EU members affected economic growth after joining the EU and 
derive lessons from these countries’ experience for the candidate countries. Employing 
different growth scenarios, they examine the beneficial effects of the EU membership and 
how long it would take for the candidate countries to fully complete the convergence process. 
They emphasize the importance of national policies to achieve a sustained period of 
significant growth above EU averages and hence real convergence towards the EU standards.  
Our paper  extends the analysis in these papers by providing not only an in depth 
theoretical foundation on the effects of integration, but also empirically testing for its 
implications on the specific aspects of growth, namely productivity and convergence. We also 
contribute to the literature by using a variety of estimation techniques that have less room for false inference due to impositions of homogeneity or neglecting of productivity growth. In 
addition, like in Martin and Velázquez (2001), Wagner and Hlouskova (2002) and Boldrin 
and Canova (2003), we provide lessons for the candidate economies by focusing the empirical 
evidence from the recent EU members. In this sense, we merge the two related but distinct 
literatures on integration and enlargement. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our theoretical model.  We describe 
our estimation technique and data in Section 3, while Section 4 reports the empirical results. 
Section 5 discusses the importance of real convergence for the candidate countries and 
provides some preliminary estimates of convergence and productivity developments for these 
economies. The last section provides a summary of the key findings of the paper, along with 
its policy implications. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
With developments in the econometrics field, 1990s have witnessed an abundance of 
studies on neoclassical growth theory and its implication of convergence. These empirical 
analyses of convergence fall into two categories. The first class of tests studies the cross-
sectional correlation between initial per capita output levels ( ,0 i y ) and the subsequent speed of 
growth ( ,,0 iti yy - ). 
  ( )
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A negative correlation (or 0 b < ) is interpreted as convergence since it implies that countries 
with lower per capita output will grow faster (Dowrick & Nguyen, 1989; Barro, 1991; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). The second set of tests utilizes time series analysis to examine the 
long-run behavior of output per capita differences across countries (Quah, 1992; Bernard and 
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A zero mean-stationary difference in output levels of country i and j implies that long term 
forecasts of output differences between the two countries converge to zero. A later study by 
Bernard & Durlauf (1996) cautions the practitioners by showing that cross sectional tests 
could exhibit negative correlation even without the existence of convergence, while time 
series tests could give misleading results when applied to countries in transition, still far away 
from their long-run equilibrium.  
Recent adoption of panel-data estimation techniques combines the dynamics in time series 
with cross sectional variation in analyses of convergence. One group of authors utilizes panel 
unit root techniques to check for the existence of a common stochastic trend as evidence of 
convergence across a panel of countries (e.g., Evans and Karras, 1996; Evans, 1998, Fleissig 
and Strauss, 2001). Recent applications of this technique (e.g., Koèenda, 2001) assume 
homogeneity in growth rates across panel countries studied. Kutan and Yigit (2004), however, 
show Koèenda’s evidence for convergence is sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity in 
growth rates, and that further investigation, especially allowing for heterogeneity, is 
necessary. That is why we choose to employ dynamic panel data estimation techniques with 
the assumption of unobservable country-specific heterogeneity (Islam, 1995; Lee, Pesaran & 
Smith, 1997; Nerlove, 2000).  
We choose to follow the methodology employed in LPS because it stands out from the 
rest of the studies by including an explicit link, rather than an ad hoc stochastic specification, 
between economic theory and their econometric model. Their work also allows for the 
maximum amount of heterogeneity in growth rates across the panel. We expand their model 
to incorporate an endogenous growth suggestion by RB-R to analyze the impact of European 
Union membership on the per capita GDP of recent entrants. The next section elaborates on 
this model.   
2.1 Derivation of testable implications 
Combination of the LPS suggested Cobb-Douglas production function with the integration 
parameter of RB-R yields 
  ( )
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where A is the labor (L) augmenting technology and Z, our contribution, is the capital (K) 
enhancing invention
2 that comes with improved dissemination of ideas and technologies 
through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).  
  Assuming  






  (4) 
the traditional evolution of capital formula gives us 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
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where si and ä are the savings and depreciation rates, respectively, and  / ititititit kKALZ =  
(since capital enhancing inventions, Z, increases effectiveness of labor). Rather than following 
the normal deterministic path of solution to this growth problem, we follow the stochastic 
method by LPS with the assumptions 
  ( ) 0 log itiiait Aagtu =++  (6) 
  ,1  where 1 aitaiaitaitai uu rer - =+£   (7) 
  ( ) 0 log itiibit Llntu =++  (8) 
and 
  ,1  where 1 bitbibitbitbi uu rer - =+£   (9) 
                                                




a =￿  where i is the index of the most 
recently invented good. where the technology shock, uait, summarizes factors that might shift total factor productivity 
(other than technological growth rate gi), and the employment shock, ubit, represents labor 
demand and supply effects other than population growth, ni. We add the stochastic process for 
Zit 
  ( ) 0 log itiicit Zztu z =++  (10) 
and assume the same autocorrelation as in the case of technological process only for 
notational simplicity.  
Using the fact that expected change in capital is zero in the steady state and omitting the 
subscript i, we obtain 
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Utilizing Jensen’s inequality, this term equals  
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Approximation of the nonlinear term in this equation around  ( ) log Ek ¥ Øø ºß  yields  
  ( ) ( )
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where  t x  is the error of approximation and  
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and  
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For small values of  , , , , and  ngh zd , they simplify to  
  ( )( ) 11 ngh ladz -»-+++-   (16) 
and  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) loglog nghnghsngh gzzdzd »++-++++--+++- Øø ºß   (17) In the deterministic version the linearization is done around the steady state k and u’s are 
assumed to be zero. For h equaling zero, the term (1 l - ) is the measure of beta convergence. 
Defining output per capita as  
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Using equations from (6) to (10), we can rewrite this as  
  ( )( ) 1 1 ttt xgtxe mlzl - =+-+++   (20) 
where 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 00 1 gngaz mlzazagl =+-++++-+   (21) 
and 






  (22) 
In the context of the Solow growth model (01 a << ), output will have a unit root only if et 
has a unit root. LPS show that the unit root i n  e only depends on the unit root in the 
technology error, ua. Therefore, assuming  ( ) 1 and  ba rrr == , as they do, and eliminating 
the autocorrelation in ua, we get 
( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 11 11111 tttt xggtxxL rmlzrlrzlrlrye -- =-+-++--+++-+-   (23) 
where  t e  is a composite error term from equations (7) and (9) and y  is a nonlinear function 
of variances/covariances of technology, employment, innovations, and the other parameters of 
the model.  The important implications of this model mentioned in LPS are the different speed of 
convergence due to the existence of h, and the difficulty of using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) type estimation techniques to evaluate convergence. This is because the autoregressive 
coefficient tested is the product of many variables like  ,,,,,, and  gnh radz  with our 
addition, and that the unit root in output not necessarily being evidence against the 
neoclassical model, but also being caused by a unit root in the technology process ( 1 r = ). 
What we illustrate with our contribution in this paper is that there is a positive impact of 
integration on a) the rate of growth via increasing the steady state value, the first term on the 
right hand side of Equation (23), b) the previously mentioned convergence rate in Equation 
(16), and  c) the productivity growth, the  coefficient of the deterministic trend again in 
Equation (23).  
As in the LPS methodology, our estimation part is based on the assumptions that the 
convergence rate and the autocorrelation in technology approximately equal the moving 
average coefficient (111 lry --- ;;), which transforms the system into 
  ( )( ) 1 1 ttt xgx t mlzle - =+-+++   (24) 
where  
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This system is a modified version of the typically adopted method of convergence testing with 
the addition of increases in the steady state term and the productivity growth. For estimation 
of  ( )  and  g lz +  separately, LPS suggests rewriting the equation 










  (26) Separating  ( )  and  g lz +  prevents any false inferences about convergence that could have 
resulted from a unit root in productivity growth. After the estimation of these equations, one 
could use these estimates to derive i m  by noting that 
  ( ) ( ) 1 iiiiii cg mllz =-++   (27) 
It is apparent that one cannot identify both g and  z  from these estimations, but a sudden 
change in the integration process could generate a structural shift in the GDP per capita. 
Results for the tests for these structural breaks are reported in Section 5.   
Prior to estimation of the system in Equation (26), LPS suggests demeaning (across i) to 
remove the cross-correlation between countries caused by the common time component. 
Therefore, the  estimated system becomes 
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  (28)   
where the common component coefficients are obtained from a similar regression  










  (29)   
Finally, coefficient values in Equation (26) are obtained by adding the estimates of Equation 
(28) to those of Equation (29).  
There are important differences in our modified LPS model from all of studies that test for 
conditional convergence. The first one is that we have an explicit constant term  ìi, 
representing differences in steady states rather than arbitrarily attaching a set of variables to 
control for differences in steady states. Despite the benefits of control variables in general, 
unnecessarily increasing the number of explanatory variables in dynamic panel studies is 
likely to increase the cross-correlation between sample countries, leading to size problems in 
the final estimation. The second difference is the fact that we allow for heterogeneity in 
technological growth rates across panel countries. LPS show that failure to account for this possible variation will bias the convergence rates, resulting in slower convergence findings. 
Third and more importantly, we apply the same methodology to a different idea to illustrate 
that exposure to a wider knowledge base results in increased rates of productivity growth and 
convergence as shown in equations (16) and (24). We do this by measuring the most recent 
members’ convergence rates and productivity growth before and after joining the EU. We 
complement the outcome of these tests with the results from a series of structural break tests 
to find that integration does generally create the intended difference. Finally we expand our 
results to comment on an important question: are the first-group EU candidate countries 
following a similar path as the recent members, and will they and the EU benefit from a 
union? 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our data set consists of quarterly GDP per capita from 13 countries; the earlier five 
members
3, for the first stage estimations, and eight EU candidates
4 for the latter stage of the 
estimations. The sample period for the member countries is from 1980 to 2002, while the 
candidate country data range is chosen to be between 1993 and 2002.
5 We exclude Slovenia 
and Cyprus in the estimations due to data limitations. We construct real GDP per capita data 
based on  purchasing power parity (PPP) values. Finally, since the classical definition of 
convergence refers to the log of real GDP per capita, we take the natural logarithm of all the 
series.  
3.2 An overview of the estimation technique 
We test Equation (26) for pre- and post-membership periods of the 5 recent members 
using Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) methodology. We choose this method 
over more complicated techniques such as the Exact Maximum Likelihood used in the LPS 
                                                
3 Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
4 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and the Slovak Republic 
5 Pre-93 period is highly unstable, reflecting the shock effects of the early 1990 reforms. (1997) paper, as well as GMM or 3SLS, due to small number of cross sectional units and a 
much larger quantity of time series observations
6. The fact that our sample countries are not 
randomly drawn from a large population and arguments by Baltagi (1995) lead us to the 
choice of fixed effects estimation over random effects.  
We demean each series with French GDP/capita as the proxy for convergence to EU 
standards
7. Then, using the reduced form coefficients from Equation (28) and the French 
coefficients
8 from Equation  (29), we obtain the structural parameters of Equation  (26). 
Utilizing these coefficients, we next check the assumption of heterogeneity versus common 
efficiency growth (g), common convergence rate (1-ë), and finally common g and common 
(1-ë). Likelihood ratio tests are used to establish the best fitting model among the four 
options. When the LR tests are not sufficient in providing a model of choice, we refer to the 
Akaike criterion to make a final determination. Results for Spain and Portugal (members 
since 1986) are displayed in Table 1 while the results for Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
(members since 1995) can be found in Table 2.  
Next, not being able to identify the shift parameter, z , caused by the integration process in 
Equation (26), we resort to two structural break tests, to examine the validity of our theory. 
Structural break tests are important for our paper not only because the theory section can't 
separate the impact of integration from the previous values of the parameters, namely the 
identification problem, but also the break tests are the direct tests of our theory displayed in 
Equation (26). The first test we use is the stochastic multiple-break test developed by Bai & 
Perron (1998) and the other one is a single break test by Banerjee et al. (1992) (later extended 
                                                
6 The bias associated with dynamic panel datasets is going to be negligible with such a high T and a low N 
(Judson and Owen, 1999; Nickell, 1981).  
7 Unit root is rejected using Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test for each panel, which enables us to refer to (1-ë) as the 
convergence rate. Also convergence can also be verified from the opposite signs on the intercept and slope 
parameters of the trend model in Tables 1-7. Tomljanovic & Vogelsang (2002) indicate that a converging 
country with an initial per-capita income lower than the French average must exhibit a positive growth trend. 
8 We use OLS to derive the estimates for these coefficients. by Sen, 2003). We apply these tests on the recent five EU member countries to examine the 
impact of integration on the growth and convergence processes. We abstain from any PPP 
adjustment in this section to measure structural changes more accurately
9.  
The Bai-Perron (henceforth BP) methodology considers the following multiple structural 
break model, with m breaks (m+1 regimes)  
  tttjt yxzu bd ¢¢ =++   (30) 
for  1 1,....., jj tTT - =+  and  1,....,1. jm =+   t y  is the observed dependent variable at time t;  t x  
(p x 1) and  t z  (q x 1) are the vector of covariates, b  and  j d  are the corresponding vectors of 
coefficients, and u is the disturbance term at time t. The break points (T) are treated as 
unknown, and are estimated together with the unknown coefficients when T observations are 
available. In the terminology of BP, this is a partial structural change model, in the sense that 
b  does not change, and is effectively estimated over the entire sample. If p = 0, this becomes 
a pure structural change model where all coefficients are subject to change.  
The procedure for detecting structural breaks, suggested by Bai and Perron, is the 
following. First, calculate the UDMAX and WDMAX
10 statistics. These are double maximum 
tests, where the null hypothesis of no structural breaks is tested against the alternative of an 
unknown number of breaks. These tests are used to determine if at least one structural break is 
present. In addition, the SupF(0|l) is a series of Wald tests for the hypothesis of 0 breaks vs. l 
breaks. In this paper, the maximum number of breaks (l) is chosen to be 3. If these tests show 
evidence of at least one structural break, then the number of breaks can be determined by the 
sequential SupF(l+1|l). If this test is significant at the 5 percent level, then l+1 breaks are 
chosen. Finally, we choose the number of breaks by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  
                                                
9 GDP per capita in real terms is used in the estimations. 
10 UDMAX stands for equally weighted double maximum test while WDMAX refers to the weighted version. Unfortunately, detecting multiple structural changes in the existence of trending terms or 
possible unit roots, as in our model specification, is quite difficult. For instance, the 
restrictions that BP mention on the application of their methodology are that a) one should not 
allow for a unit root, and that b) when a lagged dependent variable is used, autocorrelation in 
the error term cannot be allowed. Despite their claim of being able to include trending terms 
in the regression, estimating a pure structural break model, in which all the coefficients could 
change, generated non-convergence in our estimations (especially for the trend variable)
11. 
Therefore, it is almost impossible to simultaneously derive structural breaks in the mean, AR 
parameter, and the trend term using the BP methodology. We tried to bypass this problem by 
estimating two versions of the system: first, a de-trended version to measure the breaks in the 
convergence rate (under the assumption of constant trend), and the second on the differenced 
version where the constant term represents the trend coefficient (and the mean break is 
undetectable). Results for these tests are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. 
We also apply another strand of the literature that allows for only a ‘single break’, but 
permits for unit roots in the existence of trend and mean breaks, namely an extension of 
Banerjee et al. (1992) by Sen (2003). We utilize the sequential F-test to test for three types of 
model originally suggested by Perron (1989): the crash model allowing for a break in the 
intercept, the changing growth model allowing for a break in the trend, and finally the mixed 
model that allows for breaks in both the intercept and the slope (AR parameter is assumed as 
constant) . The general model we use is  
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where DUt(
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b T ) is the indicator function that equals 1 after the break date 
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the model for possible serial correlation in the disturbance term. Lag length is chosen using 
the methodology suggested by Ng & Perron (1995).  
Sequential maximum F-test statistics presented in Sen (2003) is:  
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where  11 ()(1,(),,(),,,....,) tbtbtbtttk XTDUTtDTTyyy --- ¢ =DD , r is the restriction matrix, q is 
the number of restrictions,  ( )
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the OLS estimator of  ,, 01231 (,,,,...,) k cc qmmmma ¢ =  in Equation (31).  For instance, if we 
want to allow for a unit root in case of trend and mean break, i.e. test for 
013 :1,0,0 H amm === , we use the restriction matrix  (0,0,1) r ¢ =  with the appropriate R.  
The results for Sen (2003) test are reported in Table 5. Please note that in our study, we 
restrict our tests to cases where trend does not coexist with a unit root since there is no 
economic rationale for that to happen in the case of real GDP/capita data.  
Finally, we apply the LPS methodology to 8 first-group candidate countries. We run two 
versions of this test first after demeaning with French GDP/capita as above, and then using 
the group mean to test for conditional convergence “within” these specific groups to examine 
their economic integration and strength of their ties. We again use LR-tests and AIC criterion 
to pick the level of heterogeneity allowed. The results are displayed in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
 
 4. Empirical evidence 
4.1.  Convergence 
The critical question we try to answer is whether membership to the EU leads to faster 
convergence and higher productivity rates. The answer to this question is not only important 
for EU policymakers, but also the candidate countries planning to join soon. Higher level of 
convergence and productivity would indicate less adjustment, smaller fiscal costs and hence 
less stabilization funds. To shed some light on these issues, we focus on the experience of the 
recent EU members by studying their performances before and after the membership, initially 
using the LPS methodology described above. Results for the LSDV tests are reported in Table 
1 for Spain and Portugal (members since 1986) and for Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
(members since 1995) in Table 2. These are followed by the results of the structural change 
tests in Tables 3 to 5.  
Findings in Tables 1 and 2 provide an interesting picture of the effects of integration to the 
Union. Our theoretical model’s implication was that all of the parameters in the equation, 
,, and  g mzl + , should increase with membership into the Union. The most recent EU 
members comply more with the theoretical implications than the older ones. This finding 
suggests that the older members already enjoyed the benefits of economic and trade 
liberalization within the region before they formally became EU members and the benefits of 
integration hence occur within a few years after joining, so it is a relatively fast process. This 
finding is consistent with evidence in Ben-David (1996) who shows that the prospect of an 
EU membership exerts a positive impact on potential entrants’ economic performance prior to 
their entry. This finding is encouraging for the candidate economies because it suggests that 
they would acquire the benefits of EU membership relatively quickly once they join in. 
Before interpreting the results in Tables 1 to 2 (also 6 and 7 later on) further, the reader 
should note that different blocks in the rows of these tables display differing levels of heterogeneity in the parameters of the model, g, ì, and (1-ë), representing productivity growth 
rate, the steady state level, and the convergence rate, respectively. Prior to commenting, we 
first pick the specification that likelihood-ratio tests reveal and then move on to the 
interpretation of those results. For instance, looking at the results for Spain and Portugal in 
Table 1, we note that the model of choice is common convergence rate option before 
becoming a member, and common productivity growth and convergence (by Akaike criterion) 
after membership. In these specifications, the only increase occurs in the estimates of the 
steady states. This switch in the model specification shows an increase in homogeneity after 
joining the EU indicating a strong integration into the common standards.  
In Table 2, there also is a switch in the specification, though not very strong. The 
preferred model (by AIC) in pre-membership is the common productivity growth, switching 
to common convergence rate afterwards. In these options, we see not only the implications of 
the theory section (increase in all coefficients) generally holding with a few exceptions, but 
also a higher degree of harmonization, namely in the convergence rate. Finland stands out 
from the rest of the group by having experienced a significant benefit in their productivity 
after membership. There also is a very healthy increase in the convergence rate of the group 
compared to the EU standards.  
4.2 Structural change tests 
Next, we apply the stochastic structural break tests by Bai & Perron (1998) and Sen 
(2003) on individual country real GDP per capita data to investigate whether integration leads 
to any changes in the coefficients of Equation (26). For the Bai & Perron test, we use two 
modifications on the original data, namely the de-trended and the differenced versions. The 
difficulty of analyzing pure structural break models in the existence of time trends and 
possible nonstationarity compel us to de-trend the data to focus on the convergence rate and 
difference it to examine the productivity growth (trend coefficient). We interpret the results, as mentioned above, by first looking at the results of the double maximum tests to determine 
whether there is ‘any break’, and then focusing on the sequential test for the consecutive 
breaks. Along with reporting these statistics and their significance levels, the tables also report 
the dates and the direction of the structural changes in the parameters of interest after the 
breaks.  
The results of beak tests, especially the BP multiple break test can be affected by several 
factors, e.g., the degree of international technology spillovers, given by the amount of FDI 
and imports, developments in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and business cycles. 
The differences in macroeconomic policies pursued as well as progress in structural reforms 
and institutional developments can also cause structural breaks in data. Given significant 
diversity across countries with respect to above factors, it is difficult to identify the exact 
factors that might cause every structural break. For our purposes, however, the critical point is 
whether there is a significant break around the time of EU accession.  
The results of Table 3, which  report the breaks in the convergence rates, confirm 
increased convergence rates in Austria, Spain and Sweden coinciding with their membership 
dates (within the confidence interval of the reported dates). Austria shows another break at 
around 1988, most likely due to one of the above factors. Finland’s break in the end of 1990 
could be the result of a finding of the ERM recovery since post-1992 is in the confidence 
interval of this break. Finally Sweden shows two other breaks; first one in early 1980s, and 
the other one coinciding with the ERM recovery, while Portugal does not have any structural 
break in its convergence rate.  
In Table 4, the results are mixed. Despite the confirmatory increases of productivity in 
Austria and Portugal coincident with their m embership, Spain and Sweden show dates 
possibly due to the other factors mentioned above. We again notice the same structural breaks 
in Austria (1986Q2) and Finland (at the beginning of 1990), later followed by a decrease in the productivity after the ERM crisis. Combining the outcome of both tables indicates the 
positive impact of the membership into the Union, either through an increase in productivity 
or the convergence rate or both, like in Austria.  
Next, we examine the results of the Sen (2003) test that searches for the single “big” 
change either in the trend (productivity) and/or the mean (steady state). The results of this test 
are more easily interpretable since the test concentrates on the largest break. Table 5 reports 
the sequential F-max statistics, the dates and directions of the structural changes. The first line 
for each country represents the break test only in the trend (same as Banerjee et al., 1992), 
while the second line adds a break test for the mean as well (Sen, 2003). We obtain critical 
values for both tests since the original studies assume iid errors and exclude serial correlation. 
First observation is that there is a significant break in each test, though mostly at differing 
dates between the two versions of the test. Allowing for mean changes brings forth recessions 
as the choice of break points (Austria, Finland, Spain, and Sweden). Increased rates of 
productivity in Finland, Portugal and Spain around their membership dates, however, clearly 
support the implications of our theory. Portugal stands out by showing increased productivity 
in both versions of the test. 
Correct inferences from the structural break tests are quite difficult, especially with 
complicated dynamics as our model. Different methods may produce different results, which 
is a natural outcome of the issues related to the structural change literature. The results can be 
sensitive to assuming a single break or multiple breaks; or whether the break is in the trend, 
the mean or whether it is a nonlinear system (regime switching). Despite such concerns, the 
reported  results  are encouraging because they  generally suggest positive changes in the 
productivity growth and are significantly stronger compared to the panel data tests; 
convergence or the steady states are never negative at the time of  accession, which is 
supportive of our theory.   
5.  Are candidate countries converging? 
Raising the candidate countries’ per capita income to the EU level serves as the most 
tangible proof of the success of integration. Within these countries, significant progress 
toward per capita income convergence is seen as key in securing the political assent of the 
population to both transition and membership in the EU. For the EU countries, such income 
growth is important if excessive population movements from the new members to the old are 
to be avoided and if the EU's budget is not to be strained by transfers to lagging economies.   
Besides above considerations, evidence on real convergence of the candidate economies 
towards the EU standards and productivity developments also has important implications for 
the design of an optimal policy towards the euro zone. First, according to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, higher labor productivity leads to higher - structural - inflation that, through 
positive inflation differential, provokes a real appreciation of the currency. At the same time, 
increasing per capita income also increases domestic demand that puts some pressure on 
domestic prices, hence the real appreciation. (Égert, 2002 and Égert et. al, 2004). An optimal 
monetary policy therefore requires a good understanding of the real convergence process. 
Second, achieving some real convergence in the early stages of the integration process would 
make it easier for the candidate countries to satisfy the M aastricht criteria on nominal 
convergence such as low inflation and stable exchange rates. The supreme goal of integration 
is economic growth and thus real convergence and nominal convergence, with nominal 
stability, underpins real convergence. Finally, once admitted into the EMU, policymakers in 
accession countries will not be able to use monetary policy any longer to achieve further real 
convergence.  Despite its significance, this issue has not received much attention in the literature. 
12  
Only a few studies examine real convergence prospects for candidate economies. Koèenda 
(2001) studies the convergence of macroeconomic fundamentals in several groups of 
transition economies. Utilizing a commonly employed panel unit root technique and a sample 
period from January 1991 to December 1998, he finds considerable real convergence. Kutan 
and Yigit (2004) report a lower level of real economic convergence than those reported by 
Koèenda when a more recent panel estimation approach developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003), which allows for more heterogeneity in the convergence rates, is utilized. Brada et al. 
(2003) find clear evidence of increasing real sector convergence between some of the first-
round candidate countries and EU.  
 In all the above studies, industrial output is utilized as a proxy for real convergence. 
Estrin et al. (2001) examine the convergence of candidate countries' per capita income to that 
of the EU average. They find that, for the period 1970-1998, none of the transition-economy 
candidate countries exhibited convergence with the EU countries. Because the greater part of 
the sample period reflects the candidate countries' performance under communism, and 
because it also incorporates the output decline of the early years of the transition, this finding 
is not surprising, nor may it be entirely germane to the issue of convergence in the context of 
EU accession.  
These limited studies do not use a theoretical framework, nor take into account of the role 
played by the integration parameter. The EU candidate economies have received significant 
amount of FDI from the EU and also increased their trade with them in the last decade. Such 
“imported” technological spillovers based on a less costly way of imitation of foreign 
innovations through both FDI and imports of goods are expected to help spur economic 
growth in the candidate countries.  Our theoretical model is therefore also applicable to the 
                                                
12 Focus has been on nominal convergence.  See, among others, studies by Backé et al. (2002), Brada and Kutan 
(2001, Èihák and Holub (2001, 2003), Janáèková (2000), and Richards and Tersman (1996). EU candidate economies. The presence of sufficient stock of human capital endowment in 
these economies, which affects their ability to imitate technical progress, also complements 
the positive effects of new technologies created through FDI and trade (Lucas, 1988 and 
Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Thus, opening up to trade and FDI inflows in the framework of 
integration process raises productivity and hence stimulates real convergence.    
Our theoretical model emphasizes the importance of including the capital enhancing 
invention variable, Z, in the endogenous growth models to capture the effects of international 
technology spillovers on productivity and convergence. It is therefore important to provide 
some preliminary estimates of real convergence for the candidate countries as well, indicating 
their progress so far. These preliminary results are useful to evaluate their further progress 
following their EU accession. Tables 6 and 7 report the results. 
Table 6 analyzes convergence of the candidate economies to the EU standards, using 
French per capita GDP as a proxy, by applying the LSDV methodology. Relying on the 
results of LR tests and AIC criterion, we observe heterogeneity in each parameter estimate 
reported in Table 6. All likelihood ratio tests reject common growth rates and steady states at 
a minimum of 95% significance level indicating that all of these countries have distinct paces 
of progress toward the EU standards. Focusing on the first block, we also note a fairly fast 
convergence rate of some these countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to 
the French GDP/capita since traditional estimates of non-OECD and oil importing countries 
average around 0.27. This finding is encouraging for these candidate countries because it 
indicates speedy convergence to EU income levels and a higher standard of living in the 
future.  
We can’t help but observe that the results also validate the LPS claim that increased 
heterogeneity raises the convergence speed. Comparing the first two sections of the table 
shows that convergence rates fall significantly when we constrain the productivity growth rates to be the same throughout the sample. Finally, we note the high productivity gains in 
Poland and Hungary,
13 and the lack of convergence of Malta to the Union, reflecting the 
differences in the amount of trade with the EU and FDI inflows from the EU. Of course, 
macroeconomic policies pursued by countries have also been an important factor for the 
convergence to EU standards.
14 
Results of Table 7 point to the common convergence rate option as the model of choice. 
The high convergence rate to the group average indicates a fast pace of integration within the 
group to common standards. Such a finding is consistent with earlier studies that find 
significant real convergence among the candidate transition economies (e.g., Brada et. al 
(2003), Koèenda, 2001 and Kutan and Yigit, 2003). This result indicates that despite the 
differences in their progress toward the EU standards, the candidate countries do not have 
significant outliers in the process of within group harmonization.  This result is important for 
EU policymakers because it signals that the candidate countries would be integrated by the 
time they join the EU, and there may not be a need to admit countries one by one based on 
their level of integration with the EU. The last notable outcome is the negativity of some 
productivity gains, in this and most other parts of the table, due to the outstanding 
performance of Poland and Hungary. 
 
7. Concluding observations and policy implications 
We examine the impact of EU integration on productivity growth and convergence for 
recent EU entrants and use their experience to draw lessons for the candidate economies. We 
deviate from the general strand of literature by deriving an explicit formulation of theoretical 
                                                
13 Available empirical evidence supports this finding. In analyzing the impacts of FDI on labor productivity 
levels on manufacturing sectors Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Barrell and Holland (2000) report 
significant productivity improvements in most sectors, while Schoors and van der Tol (2002) find that the 
presence of foreign firms creates positive spillover effects on productivity of local firms in Hungary. 
14 Kaminski and Riboud (2000) emphasize the importance of the stability of macroeconomic policies pursued in 
Hungary. 
 effects of integration by introducing a new variable that captures the effects of international 
technology spillovers. We also provide empirical evidence on the theoretical implications of 
the model, using panel data estimation techniques and a battery of structural break tests.  
The results regarding recent EU members reveal three interesting observations. First, 
downward bias in the convergence rate is confirmed when heterogeneity in productivity rates 
is not allowed. Comparison of the first two sections of all the tables shows slower 
convergence rates resulting from the imposition of a common productivity assumption. 
Second, almost all coefficient estimates are positively affected with membership to the EU. 
This result is supported by structural change tests of Bai and Perron (1998) and Sen (2003). 
Third, there is an increasing amount of harmonization, especially in convergence rates.  
Regarding the candidate countries, in addition to the above observations, there is also a 
significant level of variation towards their progress to the EU standards of living. Some 
countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland stand out in terms of 
productivity growth or convergence rates, while others seem to do poorly.  An important 
policy implication of the heterogeneity result is that the candidate economies would exhibit 
different productivity and convergence levels, following their entry. At this stage, regional 
and structural funds, similar to those provided to the recent EU members, may be useful to 
help the poorer candidate countries catch up. However, evidence indicates that such funds are 
not able to generate long-run growth effects (Boldrin and Canova, 2003).  
The candidate countries’ economic conditions today look similar to those of Spain and 
Portugal at the time of their entry (Boldrin and Canova, 2003). Therefore, the costs and gains 
from joining the EU will likely to be similar to those experienced by these entrants. This 
observation, along with the harmonization experience these countries’ growth rates display, 
signals that the differences in productivity and convergence levels are expected to fade out over time, a finding that is also supported by the increasing homogeneity within the candidate 
countries.  
A larger and richer EU market with no exchange rate risk, which the recent entrants were 
not able to enjoy, will further facilitate the convergence process for the candidate economies. 
National policies encouraging further trade and FDI flows with the EU, as well as free labor 
and capital mobility, along with supply side and fiscal reforms, will therefore play a much 
more important role to achieve growth rates higher than EU averages and hence real 
convergence. The evidence of positive impact of integration on growth rates and productivity 
reported in this paper suggests that gained benefits over time will be more than outweigh the 
expected short-run consequences of the accession process, thereby making Europe a more 
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Table 1: Growth in Spain and Portugal before and after joining the EU (demean with France) 




















  LR = 7.16




ì  -0.13  3.86  0.47  0.73 














  LR = 12.96











Notes: g represents technological/productivity growth, ì is a mixed variable that shows different steady states, 
and 1-ë is the convergence rate. Growth rates are annualized values. Values for ì rather than c are reported in 
these tables due to the implications of the theoretical section about this parameter. Significance values are not 
reported for ì since it is composed of the product of three parameters. Critical values used for LR tests are 3.84 
(2.71) for 
2
1 c  (first two tests) and 5.99 (4.61) for 
2
2 c  (last test). *** indicates significance at 99% while ** and 
* correspond to significance at 95% and 90%, respectively. 
§ indicates choice by AIC criterion. 
 
Table 2: Growth in Austria-Finland-Sweden before and after joining the EU 
(demean with France) 












  All heterogeneous   
g  0.05
*  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.08
***  0.045 








  LR = 2.09
§  Common productivity growth  LR = 4.34 
g  0.05
*  0.045 








  LR = 3.27  Common convergence rate  LR = 0.90
§ 
g  0.06
*  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.08
***  0.045 




  LR = 7.38  Common productivity and convergence rate  LR = 12.17
*** 
g  0.045  0.045 




Notes: Insignificance for g indicates replacement with the productivity rate and steady state coefficient estimates 
for France, namely 0.045. Significance values are not reported for ì since it is composed of the product of three 
parameters. Critical values used for LR tests are 9.49 (7.78) for 
2
4 c  and 5.99 (4.61) for 
2
2 c .  
 Table 5: BP Structural Break Test Results in Autoregressive Coefficient (Convergence Rate) 
Country  UDmax  WDmax  Sequential (2|1)  Sequential (3|2)  BIC choice  Break dates 
 at 5% 
1987Q4 ￿  Austria  18.80
***  47.06
***  14.79




***  4.77  0.05  2  1990Q3 ￿ 
Portugal  5.60  7.13  11.85
**  12.50
**  2   
Spain  32.17
***  80.54
***  0.04  0.0004  0  1984Q3 ￿ 
1982Q4 ￿ 
1993Q3 ￿  Sweden  289.44
***  724.48
***  0.01  28.23
***  0 
1996Q4 ￿ 
Notes: A maximum of three breaks are allowed due to sample size. UDMAX and WDMAX results are for the double 
maximum tests of Bai & Perron (1998). The sequential tests examine the likelihood of having i+1 breaks given that i 
breaks exist. BIC choice column refers to the number of breaks according to the Bayesian Information Criterion. The 
confidence intervals for the break dates are not reported to save space. Break dates are reported when the double maximum 
tests point to the existence of at least one break.  
 
 
Table 6: BP Structural Break Test Results in the Trend Coefficient (Productivity Growth) 
Country  UDmax  WDmax  Sequential (2|1)  Sequential (3|2)  BIC choice  Break dates 
 at 5% 
1986Q2 ￿  Austria  11.88
***  19.21
***  8.66










***  3.63  4.29  0  1984Q3 ￿ 
Spain  9171.7
***  22857.0
***  4.57  1.22  0  1997:03 ￿ 
Sweden  11.74  18.98  2.11  4.29  0  1984:03 ￿ 
Notes: The autoregressive coefficient is held constant to capture the gradual breaks in the trend as opposed to sudden ones. 
 
 
Notes:  Critical values derived in Monte Carlo simulations for sequential F-max test are 7.93, and 9.17 for stationary break 
models at 90%, and 95%, respectively. DM represents a change in the mean, while DT is the change in trend. 
 
Table 7: Single break test (Sen, 2003) results for trend and mean breaks  
Austria  Finland  Sweden 
  F-max  Date  DM  DT  F-max  Date  DM  DT  F-max  Date  DM  DT 
Trend 
alone  63.12
**  1987Q2    ( + )  14.80
**  1996Q2    ( + )  11.59
**  1990Q3    (-) 
Trend + 
Mean  11.40
**  1992Q4  (-)
**  ( + )  76.72
**  1991Q3  (-)
**  ( + )  79.32
**  1992Q1  (-)
**  ( + ) 
Portugal  Spain 
  F-max  Date  DM  DT  F-max  Date  DM  DT 
Trend 
alone  14.96
**  1984Q1    ( + )  65.00
**  1986Q4    ( + ) 
Trend + 
Mean  32.40
**  1985Q4  ( + )
 **  ( + )  36.10
**  1993Q2  (-)
**  ( + )
 *    
Table 6: Estimation of growth in EU candidate countries (demean with France) 
  Country/Coeff.  g  ì  1-ë 
Czech Rep.  0.10
***  -0.56  0.31
*** 
Estonia  0.04  -0.13  0.09
*** 
Hungary  0.23
***  -0.99  0.42
*** 
Latvia  0.14
**  -0.37  0.15
*** 
Lithuania  0.18
***  -0.64  0.23
*** 
Malta  0.06
***  -1.37  -0.11 
All heterogeneous 
Poland  0.29
***  -0.52  0.20
*** 
  Slovakia  0.12
***  -0.74  0.32
*** 
Czech Rep.  -0.28  0.18
*** 
Estonia  -0.15  0.10
*** 
Hungary  -0.02  0.03
*** 
Latvia  -0.20  0.10
*** 
Lithuania  -0.34  0.17
*** 
Malta  -1.38  -0.11 
Common Productivity 
Growth 
Poland  -0.02  0.04
*** 
LR = 18.25






Czech Rep.  0.09
***  -0.37 
Estonia  0.20
***  -0.54 
Hungary  0.22
***  -0.47 
Latvia  0.18
***  -0.59 
Lithuania  0.15
***  -0.54 




***  -0.57 
LR = 29.21
***  Slovakia  0.11




Czech Rep.  -0.26 
Estonia  -0.31 
Hungary  -0.26 
Latvia  -0.36 
Lithuania  -0.32 
Malta  -0.20 
Common productivity 
growth and convergence 
rate 
Poland  -0.28 
LR = 51.17






Notes: Cyprus and Slovenia are left out due to data unavailability. Insignificance means parameter values are not 
significantly different than the French values. Significance values are again not reported for  ì since it is 
composed of the product of three parameters. 95% (99%) critical values used in the LR tests are 14.07 (18.48) 
for 
2
7 c  (first two tests) and 23.69 (29.14) for 
2
14 c  (for the last test). 
 
 Table 7: Estimation of growth in EU candidate countries (demean with group average) 
  Country/Coeff.  g  ì  1-ë 
Czech Rep.  -0.07
***  0.14  0.25
*** 
Estonia  0.01  -0.02  0.14
*** 
Hungary  0.03
**  0.04  0.35
*** 
Latvia  0.03
**  -0.23  0.36
*** 
Lithuania  0.06
***  -0.24  0.35
*** 
Malta  -0.10




***  -0.19  0.50
*** 
  Slovakia  -0.04  0.00  0.19
*** 
Czech Rep.  -0.01  0.06
*** 
Estonia  -0.05  0.17
*** 
Hungary  0.04  0.35
*** 
Latvia  -0.25  0.37
*** 
Lithuania  -0.18  0.31
*** 




Poland  -0.04  0.27
*** 
LR = 16.22





Czech Rep.  -0.07
***  0.17 
Estonia  0.06
***  -0.12 
Hungary  0.04
***  0.02 
Latvia  0.02
*  -0.18 
Lithuania  0.04
*  -0.17 
Malta  -0.12




***  -0.12 
LR = 10.07  Slovakia  -0.06
***  0.04 
0.29
*** 
Czech Rep.  0.04 
Estonia  -0.01 
Hungary  0.04 
Latvia  -0.07 
Lithuania  -0.03 
Malta  0.10 
Common productivity 
growth and convergence 
rate 
Poland  0.01 
LR = 54.27





Notes: 95% (99%) critical values used in the LR tests are 14.07 (18.48) for 
2
7 c  (first two tests) and 23.69 
(29.14) for 
2
14 c  (for the last test). 
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